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Abstract: 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the developments of welfare states in highly 
developed nations since WW2 within the context of a narrative which seeks to combine 
institutional distinctions, termed ‘varieties of capitalism’, with the historical regimes of 
regulation theory in a political economy perspective which puts interested political actors 
at centre stage. It will be argued that in a liberal democracy, the elite has the framing 
and agenda-setting power to ‘manufacture a political will’ according to its interests. The 
welfare state is not the result of a long social struggle on the part of the needy; rather, 
it results in its general features from the minimal state of meritocratic exigencies. Under 
the very peculiar circumstances of the post-WW2 era, this even translated into a rise in 
social welfare spending to more than a third of national income. The particular design of 
welfare state organisation was the subject-matter of political conflict, and a clear 
distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies can be attributed to 
cultural differences and institutional settings. Yet the core of the welfare state 
conception serves the interest of the meritocracy as much as those who benefit from 
social programmes and re-distribution. And the neoliberal attack on the welfare state 
since the 1980s is not a necessary re-calibration due to changing economic conditions or 
a growing lack of solidarity among the people but an expression of a modified cost-
benefit analysis from the elite’s perspective. 
 
Key words: Welfare State, Keynesian National Welfare State, Schumpeterian 
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1. Introduction 
The discussion about the welfare state is older than the welfare state itself: will an 
economy be able to shoulder the cost of a welfare state? Will the welfare state allow the 
lazy and unproductive to ‘soak the rich‘? Is the welfare state sustainable in the age of 
globalisation? Is the welfare state adequately adjusting to the challenges of globalisation, 
ageing societies, and individualisation? Or is it being restructured as an unfortunate 
consequence of otherwise noble intentions (such as the uniting of Europe) or, perhaps 
worse, the backlash resulting from the pursuit of vested interests? 
Of course, this paper cannot address all these questions. That is neither the objective nor 
even possible in a research paper such as this. Instead, it attempts to shed some light on 
the developments of welfare states in highly developed nations since WW2 within the 
context of a narrative which seeks to combine institutional distinctions, termed ‘varieties 
of capitalism’, with the historical regimes of regulation theory in a political economy 
perspective which puts interested political actors at centre stage. In this attempt, it extends 
an earlier paper on the political economy of modernisation (see Heise 2008). 
We are aware that this is an ambitious task. Likewise, we accept that many of the ideas 
advanced in this preliminary attempt to explain a very complex matter can be challenged 
and, at any rate, require refinement through further research. Nevertheless, we hope the 
present contribution provides a better understanding of what is currently happening in 
modern welfare states and the direction in which  they seem to be heading. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next part, the welfare state is defined, its origins 
traced, and a sketch of its quantitative development is outlined. That establishes the 
groundwork for the second part in which a political economy perspective is elaborated 
and empirically tested. The paper concludes with an outlook.     
2. The welfare state in a historical perspective 
Although the welfare state is a fairly new concept, social policies and social provisions 
are not. Therefore, the welfare state appears to be more than the mere aggregation of 
social programmes in specific historical circumstances. Social policies and social 
provisions simply take account of the fact that individuals and families may not – for 
whatever reason – be able to sustain themselves economically and that, particularly in the 
absence of feudal relations, society somehow has to step in. In this sense, the ‘poor laws’ 
(‘Poor Law Act’ of 1601; see e.g. Frazer 1984) can be understood as the beginning of 
social policies in the UK and later in the USA; similarly, company-based ‘family 
allowances’ mark the start of social policy in France (see e.g. Castel 1995), while in the 
German-speaking world the so-called ‘social question’ (‘soziale Frage’) highlighted the 
needs of ‘double-free’ landworkers and their families after the end of feudal dependency 
(see e.g. Pankoke 1970). Social policies and provisions in this sense can be seen as being 
based on the rationale of natural law, intended to stabilise through policy an otherwise 
unstable society.     
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2.1. What is the welfare state? 
The welfare state, which in reality developed only after the second world war in most 
highly developed countries of the western world, is not merely the extension and 
development of such just-mentioned social policies in the modern context. Rather, it is 
the summation and institutionalisation of all such policies designed to provide (and to 
finance) social public goods, to collectively interfere in the free market transactions of 
individual agents in order to change market outcomes (particularily income distribution), 
and to democratise economic relations. The welfare state, thus, comprises social policies 
to collectively (as opposed to individually) insure against systemic risks to life such as 
sickness, unemployment, old age, and poverty (financed via taxes and social 
contributions) as well as employment regimes covering labour markets, collective 
bargaining, worker participation systems, and macroeconomic policies designed to 
maintain high levels of employment. 
Different varieties of welfare systems developed following differing institutional and 
cultural paths. The most common types have been categorised as Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism‘, which distinguishes a social democratic, a 
continental, and a liberal model and as Peter Hall’s and David Soskice’s (2001) binary 
distinction between a liberal and a coordinated economic system. For the sake of 
simplicity, we base the following on the Hall/Soskice model: the liberal market economy 
(LME) combines a fairly meritocratic orientation with a firm belief in the virtues of 
flexible, unregulated markets and only very limited interventions of any kind. The focus 
is on allocative optimisation with few distributional objectives. The coordinated market 
economy (CME) is concerned more with productive optimisation1, which require some 
encompassing organisations in the process of collective bargaining, a higher level of 
generosity regarding social public goods, and employee relations founded on 
participation in exchange for effort and commitment. In comparison with the liberal 
model, the production possibility frontier is pushed outwards, but at the same time income 
distribution is more equal.         
2.2. The welfare state as the outcome of class conflict? 
Social policies and programmes in the early period of capitalist development were rarely 
established through revolutionary actions on the part of the poor and underprivileged. 
Instead, they have been conceded by the ruling elite in order to appease the people and to 
integrate them into the power structure that eventually became the modern state. The 
earliest, embrionic version of a welfare state – Reichschancellor Bismarck’s Sozialstaat 
of the 1870s – was a piece of realpolitik designed to weaken the emerging social 
                                                            
1 We need to elaborate a bit more on the distinction between ‘productive efficiency’ and ‘allocative 
efficiency’. ‘Allocative efficiency’ refers to the static logic of short-term equalisation of prices and marginal 
utility/marginal productivity via timeless quantity adjustments. ‘Productive efficiency’, on the other hand, 
refers to the dynamic logic of long-term output/income maximisation via regulatory and institutional 
incentives and complementarities (see e.g. Estevez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice 2001). The trade-off between both 
efficiencies manifests the background to the different types of institutional embeddedness of economic 
activities that has been termed ‘varieties of capitalism’ (see e.g. Hall/Soskcie 2001; 
Hancké/Rhodes/Thatcher 2007). 
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democrats and to offer the growing working classes and their trade unions a position in 
the newly formed Deutsche Reich.  
A brief history of the development of welfare states must explain the extraordinary 
increase in welfare spending during and after WW2 that occurred in almost every country 
and particularly in the highly developed democratic nations in the west. As shown in fig. 
1, social welfare spending quadrupled in Germany and Austria and increased more than 
a hundredfold in Italy between 1930 and 1980. 
 
Figure 1: Total social expenditures as % of GDP 1880 – 1980 
 
Source: Data from 1960 to 1979 corresponds to estimates based on OECD (1985). Data 
before 1930 corresponds to Lindert (2004).  
 
Basically, there are two ways to explain this development: a functional one and a realist 
one. The functionalist account argues that the transformational change of industrialising 
economies and societies demanded and, due to a growing similarity of working and living 
conditions and the insurability of similar life risks, facilitated the emergence of social 
programmes and is, therefore, “the root cause of welfare development” (Wilensky 1975: 
35). The welfare state, according to this view, is the systemic answer to the needs of 
functionality. As always with functionalist theories, this one is difficult to falsify and, at 
any rate, must somehow be translated into political action. 
The realist account puts emphasis on political factors, arguing that the development of 
the welfare state directly mirrors class conflicts or, more indirectly, political partisanship 
in representative democratic societies2. The implication is that the higher the power 
                                                            
2 The dominant theory of political economics, interestingly, does not recognise the category of ‘class 
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resources of the needy are – in terms of a strong labour movement with strong trade 
unions (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983; Korpi 2006; Korpi/Palme 1998, 
Korpi/Palme 2003) and with leftist political parties winning elections – the better 
endowed and re-distributive the welfare state will be.  
With regard to conflicts, two main types of class conflict have been identified (e.g., see 
Edlund/ Lindh 2015): political conflicts, that is political skirmishes between classes 
within the parliament, and social conflicts, which are based on tensions outside the 
domain of parliament, such as strikes and lock-outs within the labour market. As 
Edlund/Lindh (2015) argue, the welfare state shifts the power struggle from a social to a 
political conflict. In other words, with the establishment of welfare state arrangements, 
the power struggle of different classes or socio-economic groups is injected into the 
democratic decision-making process. In this interpetation, the foundations of welfare 
states extend back to social conflicts in the first place, which transform into political 
conflicts which, in turn, shape the development of the welfare state and must be able to 
explain the differences in welfare state endowments in terms of the outcome of the 
political conflict: countries with longer spells of leftist governments must clearly produce 
stronger welfare states than countries under more conservative (‘rightist’) rule. However, 
neither the inter-war years nor the early years after WW2 – i.e. those periods which must 
be regarded as giving birth to the modern welfare state – record large-scale social conflicts 
despite economic and social hardship for many people after the Great Depression and the 
devasting effects of warfare. Moreover, tab. 1 clearly shows no distinct correlation 
between governmental partisanship and the opulence of the welfare state: although long 
spells of leftist governments in Sweden seem to correspond with the partisan theory of 
the highly endowed and highly re-distributive welfare states, this is obviously not the case 
for the USA or Germany: in the former, leftist governments produced only a ‘meager’ 
welfare state, and in the latter, rightist goverments shaped one of the best endowed 
welfare states. Moreover, in the UK – as in the USA – the conceptual foundations of the 
welfare state enacted by ‘leftist’ parties – the ‘Beveridge Plan’ put into practice by the 
Labour government of Clement Attlee in the UK and the ‘New Deal’ enacted by the 
Democrat president Franklin D. Roosevelt in the USA – were not the ideological weapons 
of staunch fighters for the underpriviledged but rather the ideas of liberal economists 
(John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge in the case of the Beveridge Plan) and 
intended to serve ‘business interests‘ (for the ‘New Deal‘ see e.g. Henry 2018: 8). 
Therefore, while partisanship – representing the intensity of political conflict – may be 
helpful in explaining differences in social protection and particular programmes, it cannot 
explain the rise of the welfare state at the end of WW2. 
                                                            
conflict’ as it deals only – since it is based on methodological individualism – with individual actor’s 
choices. The resulting median voter theorem – the political equivalent of the representative economic actor 
– however fails even to explain why rational voters vote in the first place and, secondly, fails to explain the 
‘paradox of re-distribution‘: under the ordinary assumption of a positive correlation between income 
inequality and the skewdness of income distribution towards the top income earners, the median voter 
theorem predicts higher re-distribution of welfare state measures with increasing income inequality, 
whereas evidence reveals the exact opposite (see e.g. Persson/Tabellini 2000: 121). Therefore, this kind of 
mainstream political economics is not considered here.  
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Only recently has war received attention as a determinant in the development of the 
welfare state. On the demand side, war-related social needs (e.g. family support for war 
casualties) and health costs caused by war injuries created direct welfare claims. 
Moreover, at least indirectly, the pervasive uncertainty during wartime has been made 
responsible for calls for comprehensive social protection (see Dryzek/Goodin 1986). And 
finally, welfare state arrangements can be seen as an offer to share the burden of warfare 
more equally and as a compensation for those in military service by the rest of society. 
Conceding that the exorbitant growth in social protection coincides with the activities 
associated with WW2 and taking into account the fact that war-related social spending 
nowhere exceeded a third of total social spending (see Obinger/Schmitt 2018), the relation 
between waging war and the expansion of the welfare state is still open to discussion. It 
is likely not a fundamental cause (how could the development of the Swedish welfare 
state otherwise be explained; see tab. 1?). Yet warfare created the environment in which 
welfare states could flourish. This is clear in the emergence of societal solidarity and with 
that a commitment to accept high levels of taxation and income redistribution; the 
emergence of antagonistic political and economic systems; and, as a result of massive 
destruction of durable consumption and capital goods and the ensuing need to replace 
those translating into greater propensity to consume and greater incentives to invest, such 
high growth rates turned the post-WW2 period not only into the ‘golden age of capitalism’ 
but, at the same time, into the ‘golden age of the welfare state’.    
 
Table 1: Political partisanship, warfare, and the welfare state 
Country Political partisanship of government in 
years during the period 1945 - 1980  
Index of 
war 
intensity 
Social 
expenditure 
in % of GDP 
in 1980 
Redistribution+ 
 Right Middle-
right 
middle Middle-
left 
Left    
France 10 5  7 3 4.7 20.23 2.25 
UK 18    17 5.3 15.58 1.32 
USA 16   19  1.8 12.84 1.43 
GER 17 3  11  8.8 21.79 2.33 
SWE   4  31 0 24.85 2.85 
AUT 4  17 4 10 8.5 21.59 2.19 
AUS 1  27  7 2.5 10.27 1.04 
NL 5  23 7  5.0 23.26 2.57 
Note: conservative/nationalistic parties are rated as ‘right’, liberal parties as ‘middle’, labour 
parties as ‘left’, and coalitions as ‘middle-right’ or ‘middle-left’, depending on the leading party 
in the coalition; grey shading indicates a dominance of parties in the conservative-liberal political 
spectrum and below average of respective indicator; yellow shading indicates a dominance of 
parties in the middle-left to left political spectrum and above average of the respective indicator; 
+ = expected benefit index at the end of period according to Scruggs  with 0 as minimum and 3 
as maximum 
Source: Obinger/Schmitt (2018: 505); Scruggs (2006); own calculation. 
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2.3. The welfare state in modern times – from golden to silver age. Or is the welfare 
state under attack? 
As we know, the ‘golden age’ did not last: after the oil-related crisis of the 1970s, mass 
unemployment in highly developed nations became a lasting problem, growth rates 
declined, the societies started to age (i.e. the ratio of the retired population to the working 
age population began to increase) and the process of growing global market integration 
put national economic and social governance under stress. 
Despite these undisputed developments, there are questions regarding how the welfare 
state evolved in the intervening decades: are we witnessing the ‘silver age’ of the welfare 
state as it responds with remarkable resilience to the above-mentioned challenges by 
transformation and adaptation (see e.g. Taylor-Gooby 2002)? Or are we in a process of 
welfare state retrenchment in the neoliberal age (see e.g. Palley 2018)? 
Figure 2: Social expenditure in percent of GDP, 1980 - 2016 
 
Source: Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) 
Figure 2 appears to support the ‘silver age’ narrative of the welfare state: although there 
are some countries – those with better endowed welfare programmes such as Sweden and 
Germany – which have actually seen a moderate decline in overall social spending (as % 
of GDP), the OECD average is still rising. This macro-quantitative view, however, may 
be challenged when we look qualitatively at particular social policy programmes. 
Nevertheless, this may still fit well with the restructuring-resilience argument.  
But this argument is put in doubt once it is realised that during the past three decades 
much greater use has been made of the welfare state than before: unemployment has risen 
considerably, health costs have increased dramatically, and with the ageing of 
populations, pension and retirement costs also have increased significantly. This casts a 
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skeptical shadow over the explanatory power of macro-quantitative data with respect to 
the endowement of welfare states (see  e.g. Allan/Scruggs 2004; Korpi/Palme 2003). 
When Palley (2018) claims a neoliberal assault on the welfare state, he highlights, 
therefore, not only absolute spending levels, but refers to the generosity level and, 
implicitly, the re-distributive effect of the welfare programmes as much as structural 
characteristics, such as a shift from comprehensive (‘universal rights’) to restricted 
(‘means-tested’) coverage. 
Upon closer inspection, what looks superficially like surprising resilience may turn out 
to be a severe roll-back of the welfare state 
3. The political economy of the welfare state 
People are related by economic, social, and political relations. Economic relations are 
seen as being basically characterised as intertemporal exchange relations, power relations, 
or relations based on nominal obligations with respect to the underlying ontological vision 
(neoclassical, Marxist, or post Keynesian). Individuals decide individually according to 
their preferences (or interests) and their material endowments. ‘Equality’ and ‘justice’ are 
not sensible criteria for economic relations. But ‘optimality’ is. And optimal 
configurations of economic relations cannot be expected to govern (if at all) unless the 
place of their interaction – the market – shows very peculiar, heroic characteristics: 
perfect competition, perfect information, and perfect foresight. In the social and political 
realm, however, individuals decide collectively. In other words, they decide on issues 
which impact not only on their personal utility but on the welfare of all – the ‘common 
good’. Political and social relations can be hierarchical or symmetric, depending on the 
decision mechanism in use. Democratic societies, as opposed to dictatorships or 
autocratic societies, have opted for the ‘logic of equality’, that is, the idea that every 
member of the society is equally well qualified to decide on collective issues irrespective 
of his material endowments or position in the society: one citizen, one vote. Moreover, 
‘qualification’ in this respect does not imply certain capabilities but merely the 
collectively shared idea of equal rights. Thus, economic and social or political relations 
in democracies differ in two important ways: economic relations are notoriously unequal 
and need to be tamed by market regulations, while political and social relations are 
intrinsically symmetric. On the other hand, following one’s own vested interest in 
economic relations does not (necessarily) conflict with the idea of maximising the welfare 
of society and may even be a requirement for this objective (Adam Smith’s famous 
‘invisible hand’). However, in political and social relations, diverging vested interests of 
individuals, groups or classes may pose serious problems because they may render 
impossible the formation of a ‘common will’, which is necessary in order to decide on 
the desired provision of collective or public goods to serve the ‘common good’. This 
phenomenon is known as Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’, implying that any collectively 
established welfare function entails the high likelihood of preference orderings 
representing merely relative majorities, in other words, absolute minorities. In order to 
legitimise such an outcome, the decision-making process must be acceptable to all. 
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3.1. Different forms of democracy 
The legitimacy of democratic social and political relations, hence, stems from its 
decision-making process (input legitimacy), not some kind of functional outcome in terms 
of economic growth, income distribution, or other criteria (output legitimacy). The 
‘common good’ needs to be derived from the preferences of the individuals forming a 
society; it cannot be superimposed by some organic (functional) description; yet 
functional outcome may impact on the actual choice being made under a given decison-
making framework. 
Classical theories of democracy argue that majority voting is the best possible way to 
secure Abraham Lincoln’s dictum of ‘government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people’ because it best fulfils the criteria of maximising self-determination, utility, 
and the likelihood of producing correct decisions (see Dahl 1989: 138ff.)3. Alternatives 
such as supermajorities or quasi-guardianships score worse on these criteria, and limited 
notions of democracy such as Riker’s ‘liberal democracy’, which restricts the objective 
of democratic majority voting to ‘removing elected officials from office when the citizens 
become dissatisfied with their performance’ (Dahl 1989: 154, paraphrasing Riker 1982: 
181ff.), may be accepted as interpretations of real-world representative democracies 
linking output and input legitimacy, but they do not challenge the supremacy claim of 
democratic majority voting. 
3.2. Democracy in an agenda-theoretical perspective – minority rule of the elite 
Although in terms of ‘input legitimacy’ there may be no better decision-making process 
than majority voting, neither Lincoln’s idea of ‘classical democracies’ where no one has 
the power over someone else nor ‘liberal democracies’ as mechanisms to put governments 
under popular scrutiny may be seen as adequately portraying modern representative 
democracies. This may be the case, as claimed by democratic elitism (see e.g. Best/Higley 
2009), because the representation needed in mass societies creates principal-agent-
problems: politicians and legislators are not simply the ambassadors of their voters; they 
moreover follow their own interests. But due to the professionalisation inherent in any 
divison of labour, they come to form an elite which is supposed to know the common will 
better than the ordinary voter – or, as Schumpeter put it, the common will is manufactured 
in much the same way as consumption patterns are created by advertisment and applied 
psychology, rather than being the objective representations of free and self-determined 
consumers4. 
As true as this may be, there is another point to be made: as the impossiblity theorem 
suggests, the common will in heterogenous societies cannot consistently be formed by 
way of simple aggregation. Notwithstanding this impossibility, majority voting has 
                                                            
3 “I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to 
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl 1971: 1). 
4 “The only point that matters here is that, human nature in politics being what it is, they are able to fashion 
and, within wide limits, even to create the will of the people. What we are confronted with in the analysis 
of political processes is largely not a genuine but a manufactured will. … The ways in which issues and the 
popular will on any issue are being manufactured is exactly analogous to the way of commercial 
advertising“ (Schumpeter 1976: 263). 
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become the most tolerated form by which to arrive at a common will. Yet this comes with 
two major drawbacks: the majority outcome in truly heterogenous societies in fact mirrors 
the preferences of a minority. As we know from the ‘voting paradox’, those minority 
preferences which can make best use of the agenda-setting and agenda-building process 
in the political arena will prevail: whoever is able to influence the voting process in a way 
that his preferences (interests) get particular attention will increase the likelihood of 
making his preference ordering a matter of general welfare. This has been addressed in 
the literature as ‘cyclical majorities’, pointing to the fact that majority voting may not 
result in stable outcomes with regard to shaping the ‘common will’. What from a 
functional perspective may be seen as problematic (ever changing policy orientations) 
may be regarded as a democratic virtue because it may give everyone the chance to 
determine the common will eventually. Yet, this is exactly what agenda theory casts into 
doubt: under the assumtion of serious information problems within the electorate, the 
framing process of political issues becomes an important tool for effectively asserting 
one’s own preferences. And as the framing process in modern democracies is basically 
controlled by the media (see e.g. McCombs/Shaw 1972), there is a strong bias in the 
framing of political issues as the ‘common will’ towards such interests that are either 
aligned with the interests of the media as capitalist corporations5 or with the media elites 
running the communication business. To summarize the argument put forward on the 
basis of Elite and Agenda theory, ‘liberal or competitive democracy’ in Riker’s and 
Schumpeter‘s sense has a strong tendency to favour minority preferences which are 
shaped by the media or capitalist elite6,7. In a Machiavellian manner, it is the task of this 
elite to use its power in such a way that the majority will not lose its confidence in the 
democratic makeup and goals of the elite’s government; in other words, they must keep 
faith in the ‘common good’ assumption of this kind of ‘liberal or competitive democray’. 
This faith may be undermined simply if the elite makes no attempt to camouflage its 
interests as ‘common good’ or if the outcome is so appalling that the process which 
creates such an outcome is contested. 
3.3. The elite’s interest and the welfare state 
The underlying assumption is the following: a ‘liberal democracy’ safeguards the 
meritocratic interests of the elite by allowing them to set the political agenda and the 
                                                            
5 There were times when, at least, part of the media were not simply capitalist enterprises but influential 
voices of religious or ideological groups (parties). The more diverse the underlying motivations of 
producing media products, the more dissonant the framing process may be.   
6 The concept of the ‘elite’ is difficult to define precisely. In the research on elites, they are taken as that 
circle of people who are in a position to have a definitive influence on political and economic decisions or, 
as Lopez (2013: 3) puts it: “… the state-of-the-art concept of elites is more closely related to the Weberian 
notion of power, understood as the capability of implementing one’s will, even against the will of others 
(…). Power can be achieved through material and/or symbolic resources. Consequently, elites can be 
defined as those in possession of those resources (…).” 
7 It is often claimed that there is no such thing as ‘the‘ elite, but the elite are functionally differentiated (e.g. 
economic, political, cultural elite, etc.) and very heterogenous in their interests. However, it is also often 
claimed that the elites are not so different in their socio-economic pedigree and, at least with respect to their 
meritocratic orientation, show very similar interests. It is the case, therefore, that the capitalist and media 
elite which have been focused on so far can be broadened towards the meritocratic interests of the elite 
without further specification.  
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agenda-building process. In doing so, the meritocracy is able to install a ‘minority rules’ 
state as opposed to the ‘majority rule’ which may ‘soak the rich’ via a strongly re-
distributive welfare state8. The interests of the meritocracy can be narrowed to the 
maximisation of absolute and relative net-income9. In order to realise this objective, 
market income (gross) needs to be determined as much as possible by de-regulated 
markets, while net income needs to be distorted as little as possible by taxes and social 
contributions, based on fiscal equivalence and re-distribution only as much is needed in 
order to guarantee social stability (the Macciavelli standard). However, in order to reach 
its highest possible market income, some regulations (e.g. unfair dismissal regulations, 
co-determinantion rights, collective bargaining agreements, or, more generally, collective 
employee relations) may help to maximise productive efficiency – in other words, a trade-
off (conflict) between productive and allocative efficiency may develop. 
In this setting, liberal democracy is compatible only with a minimal state in the sense that 
re-distributive state action comprising interventions into not only the process of income 
generation and distribution but also the (re-)distribution of power (at the individual level 
as decommodification or the collective level as participation) will be accepted only in an 
output-oriented perspective as long as it pleases the meritocracy10. Such minimal states 
may look very different over time, taking differing historical settings into account, and 
also very different across nations, taking differing cultural norms and backgrounds and 
institutional settings into account (see tab. 2). Therefore, we may end up with a ‘variety 
of liberal capitalisms’ showing quite different levels of redistribution, 
decommodification, and participation – i.e. welfare state organisations – over time (i.e. 
Keynesian National Welfare States of the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’ to Schumpeterian 
Competition States of the ‘Silver Age of Capitalism’) and across nations (i.e. liberal 
economies, coordinated economies). 
       
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Larry M. Bartels (2008: 285) concludes his study ‘Unequal Democray’ with this passage: “… affluent 
people have considerable clout, while the preferences of the people in the bottom third of the income 
distribution have no apparent impact on the behavior of their elected officials.” That description of the 
situation in the US can be seen as an ordinary characteristic of a ‘liberal democracy’.  
9 Although it is unclear whether the prime interest of the elite is ‘power’ or ‘wealth’, the relation of these 
two objectives appears to be complementary rather than substitutional. In any case, it is the common 
procedure in political economics to take income as the predominant factor determining the utility of 
groups or classes; see e.g. Persson/Tabellini (1999)  
10 The exact process of how the elite manage to make their interests the subject of the ‘common good’ 
pursued by democratically elected governments of different partisanship must be the subject-matter of 
further research of the kind found in Heise (2005). It may be worth mentioning that the convergence of 
party programmes explained by public choice theories to be the result of the ‘median voter theorem’ can 
also be interpreted as the result of the agenda-setting and framing power of the elite creating ‘policy 
constraints’ which parties of any partisanship have to accept (see e.g. Merkel 2001). 
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Table 2: Varieties of capitalism and varieties of state conceptions  
 Liberal Market Economy Coordinated Market 
Economy 
Keynesian National 
Welfare State (KNWS) 
 
(1950s – 1970s) 
− social security system 
based on Beveridge 
orientation (means 
tested) 
− strong trade union rights 
− decentralised collective 
bargaining system with 
strong ‘local 
pushfulness’ 
− Keynesian demand 
management 
− strong capital controls 
− social security system 
based on Bismarck 
orientation (compre-
hensive) 
− strong labour market 
regulation + 
participation rights 
− centralised collective 
bargaining system 
− Keynesian demand 
management 
− strong capital controls 
Schumpeterian 
Competitive State (SCS) 
 
(1980s – 2000s) 
− social system retrench-
ment 
− anti-trade union regula-
tions 
− marginalised collective 
bargaining system  
− rhetorically: supply-
oriented policies 
(but, if needed: demand 
management)  
− deregulated financial 
markets 
− moderate social 
retrenchment 
− moderate 
decentralisation of 
collective bargaining 
system 
− rhetorically: industrial-
relations overhaul 
(but effectively: basically 
continuation of ER system) 
− supply-oriented policies 
− deregulated financial 
markets 
Source: Own account 
     
 
KNWS and SCS are variations of liberal (i.e. meritocratic) capitalism. While the postwar 
years experienced a phase of system competition and a strong popular belief in 
technocratic governability (socio-cybernetics), the meritocracy was forced to prove that 
capitalism can handle the potential trade-off between productive efficiency and allocative 
efficiency better than its counterpart in the socialist world. Although productive 
superiority was seemingly easy to prove, it was not supposed to come at the cost of a 
clearly inferior distributional result, showing much more absolute and relative poverty 
among the non-meritocracy. 
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Figure 3: Determinantion of re-distribution in varieties of liberal democracies 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 attempts to capture these ideas. From a meritocratic perspective, the optimal size 
of re-distribution through welfare state programmes is determined in two different 
varieties of capitalism: the liberal market economy (LME) and the coordinated market 
economy (CME). The LME is characterised by a more uncritical belief in the virtues of 
free markets11, less regulation of labour markets, and weaker labour market institutions, 
fostering a capital market-based short-term profit-maximization strategy (‘shareholder-
value’). Yet it entertains a stronger belief that income inequality is a necessary and 
tolerated sign of success (‘meritocratic culture’). The CME relies more on bank-based 
long-term profit maximization (‘stakeholder value’), fostering incentives to enhance 
productive efficiency to the detriment of market flexibility (allocative efficiency). This 
includes both labour market regulations to increase human capital investments and 
worker participation schemes. This goes along with the idea that the cohesion of society 
allows for only a certain income inequality (‘egalitarian culture’). The upper left quadrant 
                                                            
11 Such a belief may be culturally enshrined in a way that actors fail to realise the options available to them, 
which have been brought to light by the research on ‘varieties of capitalism’.  For instance, when confronted 
with research results indicating that German style employee relations based on participation rights and 
labour market regulations give German companies a competitive advantage based on higher labour 
productivity even within the confines of a ‘liberal market economy’ (see Tüselmann/McDonald/Heise 
2003), British managers declared that they simply cannot handle any kind of cooperative labour relations.  
Income 
inequality 
Income of 
highest decile 
Income of 
highest decile 
45° Re-distribution 
UNR 
LME 
CME 
Meritocratic culture 
Egalitarian culture 
CME 
LME 
LME with strong 
‘local pushfulness’ 
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of fig 3. depicts the idea that a growing income inequality will increase the income of the 
meritocratic elite only to a certain point. Once this point is surpassed, absolute income of 
the meritocracy will fall although relative income (income inequality) will continue to 
rise. This may be so because aggregate demand may suffer from ever increasing income 
inequality as much as the cost of protecting income-generating wealth will rise. Due to 
differences in cultures, the point of maximum income of the elite will be at higher income 
inequality in the LMEs as compared to the CMEs. And because liberal market economies 
favour allocative efficiency over productive efficiency, absolute income determined by 
total factor productivity may be lower in LMEs than in CMEs.  
The lower right quandrant illustrates that some re-distribution from the successful to the 
less successful market participants will be necessary in order to maximise the income for 
the meritocracy. Feelings of insecurity associated with the opening of an economy to the 
global market or the introduction of new technologies (enhancing allocative as well as 
productive efficiency) may well cause costly opposition to such developments and result 
in demands for social compensation; in other words, part of the overall gain will have to 
be re-distributed to the potential losers of such developments. And as the CME favour 
productive over allocative efficiency, they may generate higher per-capita income but 
might be compelled to pay higher compensation to the non-meritocracy.     
Finally, the upper right quadrant portrays the mechanism by which income inequality is 
basically brought about: disequilibrium in the labour market – i.e. unemployment – will 
put pressure on the wage bargaining process – as the main determinant of income 
distribution (see Förster 2000) – in order to bring about the desired income inequality. 
And here, the stronger institutions of coordinated market economies need more pressure 
(i.e. higher unemployment) to produce a certain inequality than liberal market economies 
do. However, LMEs may only de jure be more flexible and less resistant to labour market 
pressure but not de facto. As Soskice (1990: 50f.) reports, the absence of comprehensive 
labour market regulations, including labour action and collective bargaining legislation, 
may well result in strong ‘local pushfulness’ from the trade unions at the company-level 
if unionisation is strong and conflict-oriented12. In such a case, as indicated in fig. 3 by 
the dashed line, the unemployment rate necessary to create the intended income inequality 
may even be higher in LMEs than in CMEs.  
What fig. 3 shows is a ‘meritocratically optimal rate of unemployment’ (MORU) and a 
‘meritocratic minimal state’ (MMS) comprising social programmes with re-distributive 
effect. MORU and MMS will look quite different with respect to the organisation of the 
economic systems: MORU is likely to be higher in CMEs while MMS will be less re-
distributive in LMEs13. Of course, MORU and MMS are only optimal states from a 
                                                            
12 Many of the policy reforms of Margaret Thachter in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA proclaimed 
as ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibilisation’ measures (OECD 1994: 105) were, in fact, regulations – yet very 
one-sided to the detriment of trade unions only (see e.g. Heise 1997).   
13 In this little model, the puzzle known as ‘paradox of redistribution’ or the ‘Robin Hood paradox’ “in 
which redistribution from rich to poor is least present when and where it seems most needed” (Lindert 
2004: 15), is comfortably explained by the pursuit of elite interests in different institutional and cultural 
settings different from electoral systems such as ‘proportional’ or ‘majoritarian’ as in Iversen/Soskice 
(2006). However, as there seems to be a strong correlation between the different electoral and economic 
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meritocratic point of view. The actual state of unemployment and the welfare system 
depends on many factors such as the degree to which the meritocracy is effectively able 
to enforce its interest as the ‘common will’ in the political system and to what degree the 
meritocracy is able to enforce the policies necessary to establish the desired MORU. The 
latter depends on the ability of the meritocracy to dominate the public discourse in terms 
of agenda-building and its ability to dominate economic research and economic 
councilling in terms of agenda-setting and policy framing.  
Moreover, MORU and MMS are also time-dependent.  As fig. 4 shows, distributive 
cultures may vary over time as much as the institutional structure of an economy and the 
orientation of public policy-making. In the years after WW2, the elite in western capitalist 
economies were faced with a very intricate situation: during the Great Depression 
capitalism had proven to be extremely unstable, and in its attempt to better economic and 
social conditions for its respective people it became extremely mercantilistic and 
dangerous to the international order. The liberal idea that the pursuit of individual and 
national interests can be reconciled with both the common good and a stable and peaceful 
international order was anything but obvious14. At the same time, communism took centre 
stage in history, challenging capitalism as the ‘natural’ order. Behind the emerging ‘iron 
curtain’, a different economic system – ‘real existing socialism’ under Soviet hegemony 
– had been established, putting pressure on those who wanted to restore capitalist order 
under democratic conditions: they had to prove that capitalism performs better in the 
economic realm (measured by levels and growth rates of per-capita income) and in the 
social realm as well (measured in terms of the distribution of income and poverty rates)15. 
Additionally, the experience of warfare over the past decade had not only strengthend the 
collective feelings and motives for solidarity (at the supply side) on the one hand and a 
                                                            
systems, we might be faced with the statistical problem of multicollinearity here.   
14 The critical attitude towards the capitalist order had already emerged after WW1 and became more 
pronouced after the Great Depression in the late 1920s and after WW2. As early as 1922, Ludwig von 
Mises, a prominent liberal economist, wrote: “The supporters of Socialism… are not confined to the 
Bolshevists… or to the members of the numerous socialist parties; all are socialists who consider the 
socialistic order of society economically and ethically superior to that based on private ownership of the 
means of production. … If we define Socialism as broadly as this we see that the great majority of people 
are with socialism today. Those who confess to the principles of Liberalism and who see the only possible 
form of economic society in an order based on private ownership of the means of production are few 
indeed” (von Mises [1922] 1932, 26–27). 
15 “The rivalry between the West and the communist bloc during the Cold War was not restricted to military 
tensions but also included fierce economic and social competitions. As its core stood the performance of 
ideologically conflicting regimes with regard to policy outcomes, sports, cultural achievements, 
technology, and economic well-being. The resulting ambitions to outcompete the rival bloc/country and to 
flaunt the achievements of one’s own political and economic regimes were strongly driven by the vested 
interests of the political elites, notably ambitions to enhance regime legitimacy. During the Cold War, 
governments of all kinds were reliant on achieving mass compliance among their populations and gaining 
political legitimacy since mass loyalty and domestic political stability were prerequisites for succeeding in 
this conflict“ (Obinger/Lee 2013:259). “Although some U.S. conservatives never fully accepted the 
principle of redistribution, the Cold War context—that is, the threat posed by the alternative of 
Communism—meant that from the 1930s through the 1970s, even Republican Presidents like Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon basically accepted the Keynesian, mixed-economy framework and the 
support of welfare programs. President Nixon even went so far as to promote a Guaranteed Minimum 
Income—a program very similar to a Universal Basic Income (UBI), the darling idea of today’s Left“ 
(Gilman 2017: ). 
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claim for collective support (at the demand side) on the other, but also had brought about 
a level of state expenditure financed by unprecedented tax rates – providing financial 
space for democratic governments to divert public expenditure away from military 
purposes. Finally, in the area of economics a new approach – Keynesianism – began to 
dominate; it not only was able to explain the occurence of the Great Depression; it 
appeared also to provide the economic tools – demand management – in order to cope 
with capitalist instability in the future. And as social policies and their re-distributive 
effects could be easily integrated into Keynesian economic governance, as well as the 
existing constraints on international mobility of commodities and factors of production 
still in place after the protectionism of WWII, a regime became acceptable and desirable 
to the meritocracy which has been dubbed ‘Keynesian National Welfare State’ (KNWS16) 
by regulation theorists (see Jessop 2004)17. One of the best known and most intensively 
researched examples of such a KNWS is the ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (see e.g. Heise/ 
Görmez Heise 2013) in Germany,  which had been established under conservative rather 
than socialist or social democratic governments. 
Figure 4 captures these ideas accordingly: in the upper left quadrant, income inequality, 
coupled with the income of the meritocracy, favouring a rather egalitarian income 
distribution even from the perspective of the elite, is termed ‘Post-WW2 collectivism’18. 
In the upper right quandrant, the institutional constraints for putting pressure on the 
collective bargaining system via unemployment are portrayed and dubbed ‘coordinated 
market economy under KNWS’; these show rather strong potenial to provide resistance, 
taking CME as an example. Moreover, the lower right quadrant sheds light on the re-
distributive content of the KNWS resulting from a cost-benefit analysis (portrayed in 
lower part of fig. 4): in a situation of pending system competition and a high demand on 
solidarity related to the war, a growing re-distributional impact of  welfare state 
arrangements provides rising utility to the meritocrats, yet at ever falling margins. On the 
other hand, rising costs are correlated not only in terms of lower absolute and relative 
income but also in terms of power sharing with a welfare state expansion which not only 
re-distributes income but also increases the degree of decommodification of labour. The 
‘meritocratic minimal state’ (MMS) is given where utility exceeds cost the most or, put 
differently, where marginal utility of a re-distributive welfare state equals marginal cost.  
 
 
 
                                                            
16 Actually, there are different labels in use. Most common is Jessop’s ‘Keynesian welfare national state’. 
Simply for linguistic reasons, I prefer to call this state conception ‘Keynesian national welfare state’.  
17 Although there is a clear co-integration between the institutional and regulatory frame named KNWS and 
the ‘golden age’ of capitalism, the direction of causality is unclear: regulation theorists argue that the 
‘golden age’ of capitalism is based on the KNWS because its institutions temporarily pacified the capital-
labour conflict intrinsic in capitalist production and, thereby, slowed down the falling trend in the profit 
rate. However, from a non-Marxist perspective, the ‘golden age’ of capitalism, considered as the result of 
a major catching-up process after the massive destruction of productive capital during WWII, could well 
be interpreted as the economic basis of a KNWS.  
18 Phillips (2002: ) reports that the rich even refrained from displaying their wealth by selling their luxurious 
homes or transferring them (temporarily) into community-related enterprises such as retirement homes or 
orphanages. 
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Figure 4: Determination of re-distribution in different historical settings 
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Clearly, with changing conditions, both the cost-benefit situation and the distributional 
culture can change significantly. While the cost may remain largely unaltered, the benefits 
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systems disappears because of the collapse of the alternative system19. This development 
may be strengthened as a result of growing economic globalisation intensifying local 
competition (‘Standortkonkurrenz’). Moreover, a shift in economic policy orientation 
from Keynesian demand management towards neoliberal supply-side policies triggered 
by a paradigm shift in the economic discipline from Keynesian to monetarist-neoclassical 
economics may additionally undermine, from the perspective of the elite, the potential 
benefits of a welfare state20. The regime formation under such altered conditions and the 
desired ‘meritocratic minimal state’ of the globalised age has been dubbed 
‘Schumpeterian Competition State’ (SCS)21,22. In conjunction with a change in the 
distributional culture towards ‘postmodern individualism’23  favouring more inequality 
(as depicted in the upper left quadrant of fig. 4) and institutional change towards 
deregulation and decentralisation of labour markets and collective bargaining systems 
(shown in the upper right quadrant of fig. 4), the diffrent characteristics of MORU and 
MMS can be described under the different state conceptions of KNWS and SCS. During 
periods of KNWS, income inequality is lower and the re-distributional content of the 
welfare state greater than in SCS, while MORU will be higher in SCS as long as labour 
market institutions remain generally stable24 
 
3.1 Some empirics of MORU and MMS 
If the political economic interpretation of the development of the welfare state given 
above as an expression of the minimal state from a meritocratic perspective in different 
historical and institutional settings is valid, we need to find empirical traces with respect 
to the development of the meritocratically optimal rate of unemployment (MORU) as 
the trigger as well as the re-distributional content of the meritocratically minimal state 
(MMS) and the relative income of the elite as objectives.    
  
                                                            
19 “By the time growth returned in the late 1980s and 1990s, the slow retreat of the socialist alternative had 
turned into a rout, as Communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself 
dissolved. Despite the return of domestic economic growth and rapidly increasing levels of inequality in 
the United States, the lack of a credible alternative form of political economy meant that the right-wing 
pushback against redistribution only intensified in the 1990s“ (Gilman 2017: ). 
20 How elite-financed think tanks enabled the ‘economic counter-revolution’ from Keynesianism to 
Neoliberalism has been thoroughly researched by Cockett (1995). 
21 Again, the label used by Jessop (2004) is different: ‘Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime’ 
(SWPR). In order to highlight locational competition in a globalised world as a focal point of dominant 
economic policy oientation, I prefer to refer to this state conception, with reference to Cerny (1989) and 
Hirsch (1995), as ‘Schumpeterian Competition State‘.   
22 For an account of the rise of neoliberalism see e.g. Harvey (2005). 
23 According to Inglehart/Oyserman (2004) economic development is a strong determinant of 
individualistic perceptions and attitudes. 
24 Particularily in CMEs, elites are torn between preserving the superior income-generating capacities of 
coordinated labour markets and collective bargaining institutions on the one hand and fighting the 
egalitarian consequences of such institutions on income distribution on the other. This may explain why 
German business elites publicly and rhetorically held a critical view regarding the German type of KNWS, 
yet pressured the conervative-liberal government of Helmut Kohl not to take legislatory action that would 
severly change the foundations of the ‘German model’ in the SCS period (see  Thelen 2000). 
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Table 3: Changing patterns of welfare state characteristics over time and across nations; 17 
OECD nations, 1960 - 2010 
 KNWS* SCS** 
 Liberal+ Coordinated++ Liberal+ Coordinated++ 
Unemployment 
rate° 
4.5 4.2 6.2 7.6 
Income 
inequality°° 
0.31 0.25 0.33 0.27 
Re-
distribution+ 
(1) 
-0.12 -0.19 -0.13 -0.2 
Re-distribution 
(2)++ 
1.61 2.39 
(2.45) 
1.55 2.28 
(2.28) 
Note: * 1960-1990; ** 1991 – 2010; + Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, USA, UK, ++ Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; ° average over the respective period; °° gini-coefficient at the 
end of respective period, no comparable data available for Japan, New Zealand and Belgium; + 
Difference between gini-coefficient of market and disposable income at the end of respective 
period, no comparable data available for Japan, New Zealand and Belgium; ++ expected benefit 
index at the end of respective period (KNWS: 1987; SCS: 2002) according  to Scruggs  with 0 as 
minimum and 3 as maximum, data in brackets: without Italy as Italian data show appear 
questionable. 
Source: Scruggs (2006); Ameco databank; Caminada/Wang/Goudswaard/Wang (2017); Wang/Caminada 
(2017) 
The picture is clear and as predicted (see tab.3): liberal market economies show a 
markedly more unequal income distribution than coordinated market economies, 
independent of the historical circumstances. Yet the re-distributive effect of the welfare 
state is more pronounced in coordinated market economies. Moreover, the re-
distributive effect has declined over time independently of the institutional setting. Due 
to an ageing population, the immense increase in health costs and an increase in 
unemployment, i.e. an exposure of a larger part of the population to welfare 
programmes, the welfare state has neither consistently declined in size – in terms of 
social expenditures in relation to GDP (see fig. 2 and part 2.2)25 – nor in its re-distributive 
                                                            
25 If one takes a more differentiated picture by focusing on different social policy areas and taking into 
account that the number of recipients (i.e. unemployed) may have changed, the result changes even with 
respect to overall social expenditure levels: “… our result strongly suggests that welfare states are less 
resilient than envisioned in the literature on ‘new politics’ (…). In fact, the 1990s – … - seem to mark a 
turning point. Until then, only the speed of expansion decelerated but since then an actual trend reversal 
has taken place. Welfare state are no longer simply growing at slower pace but shrinking. At the same time, 
social spending is directed less at curbing inequality and more oriented towards the elderly and services. 
As a consequence, the welfare state becomes less decommodifying and more supportive of markets“ 
(Elsässer/Rademacher/Schäfer 2015: 8f.). 
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effect, if measured by a change in income inequality before and after taxation and social 
transfers by gini-coefficients (see tab. 3 row 3). However, if the ‘generosity’ of the 
welfare state is measured by coverage ratio and financial alimentation per individual 
case (see tab. 3, row 4), it appears hard to deny that the  re-distributional content of 
welfate state systems has declined – and this is even more pronounced if instead of the 
average of pre- and post-welfare-gini-coefficients, the quintiles are compared on the 
income scale. While re-distribution towards the lowest income quintile decreased by 
about 1 percentage point during the ‘Schumpeterian Competion State‘ period is 
compared with the ‘Keynesian National Welfare State’ period, we see re-distribution 
towards the highest income quintile (or, rather, the reduction in contributing to re-
distribution) increased by about 0.6 percentage points before the time of the world 
financial crisis (see Causa/Hermansen 2018: 42; after the world financial crisis, due to 
rising unemployment, the redistributional contents increased slightly, only to start to 
decrease again when the economies started to recover and austerity programmes 
started to show an impact).    
Moreover, the unemployment rate increased quite significantly during the SCS era as 
compared to the KNWS period, in both the LME as well as the CME (see tab. 3, row 1). 
However, during the KNWS period, unemployment was slightly lower in CMEs as 
compared to LMEs. This would be consistent with our proposed model only if we assume 
‘strong local pushfulness’ as a characteristic of LMEs. Of course, most economic and 
labour market reforms in LMEs at the beginning of the 1980s sought to curb the power 
of trade unions and deregulate labour markets. Once these measures started to have an 
impact, the unemplyoment rate in LMEs fell below the unemployment rate in CMEs26. 
Finally, the ultimate objective of the meritocracy – income maximisation –  showed a 
very peculiar development which appears entirely consistent with the approach 
presented here (see tab. 4): independently of the economic system, the relative income 
of the top income earners (10th income decile) declined during the KNWS period under 
the conditions explained above – and more so in CMEs than in LMEs. However, this 
decline, as compared to the pre-war years, was more than reversed during the SCS 
period when the collective and system pressure on the meritocracy dwindled – and 
more so in LMEs than CMEs.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 While the average unemployment rate in LMEs as compared to CMEs during the 1960s was 2.6% to 
1.9% and 3.9% to 3.7 % in the 1970s, it rose to 7,0% as compared to 7.1% in the 1980s and 6.9% to 8.3% 
in the 1990s (own calculations; sources: see tab. 3). 
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Table 4: Top decile income share in LME and CME across time and nations 
 (1) 
1950 
(2) 
1979 
(3) 
2010 
(4) 
KNWS 
(2 – 1) 
(5) 
SCS 
(3 – 2) 
LME+ 0.33 0.31 0.38 -0.02 +0.07 
      
CME++ 0.33 0.28 0.33 -0.05 +0.05 
Note: + = Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, USA, UK; ++ = Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands 
Source: World Inequality Database (http://wid.world.data) and Piketty (2014:Chap.9) 
 
4. Conclusion 
In a liberal democracy, the elite has the framing and agenda-setting power to 
‘manufacture a political will’ (see Schumpeter 1976: 263) according to its interests27. The 
welfare state, “one of the great social innovations of the 20th century” (Palley 2018: 32), 
is not the result of a long social struggle on the part of the needy; rather, it results in its 
general features from the minimal state of meritocratic exigencies. Under the very 
peculiar circumstances of the post-WW2 era, this even translated into a rise in social 
welfare spending to more than a third of national income – up from less than a twentieth 
of GDP at the beginning of the 20th century. The particular design of welfare state 
organisation was the subject-matter of political conflict, and a clear distinction between 
liberal and coordinated market economies can be attributed to cultural differences and 
institutional settings. Yet the core of the welfare state conception serves the interest of 
the meritocracy as much as those who benefit from social programmes and re-
distribution. And the neoliberal attack on the welfare state since the 1980s is not a 
necessary re-calibration due to changing economic conditions or a growing lack of 
solidarity among the people but an expression of a modified cost-benefit analysis from 
the elite’s perspective. 
Taking into consideration that the recent world financial crisis has been exploited to 
increase the pressure on the welfare state by introducing austerity measures allegedly in 
order to sustain public finances, one might argue that the future of the welfare state might 
look bleak. However, this is not the only possible direction forward: with the digital 
revolution and the growing importance of social media, the meritocracy’s agenda-setting 
and framing power may be undermined (see e.g. Gillmor 2004; McCombs 2005; Meraz 
2009). It may be too early to judge the full consequences of these structural changes in 
the media landscape, but it might help to relax the ‘political constraints’ of the 
meritocracy‘s ‘TINA’ rhetoric. 
                                                            
27 Thorstein Veblen pinpointed this insight already as early as the beginning of the 20th centrury when he 
declared in his famous ‘Vested Interest and the Common Man’: “So that the population of these civilised 
countries now falls into two main classes: those who own wealth invested in large holdings and who thereby 
control the conditions of life for the rest; and those who do not own wealth in sufficiently large holdings, 
and whose conditions of life are therefore controlled by these others. It is a division, not between those who 
have something and those who have nothing -- as many socialists would be inclined to describe it -- but 
between those who own wealth enough to make it count, and those who do not” (Veblen 1919: 160f.). 
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Moreover, the elite remains constrained by the democratic scrutiny of the majority and 
the possibility that a high cost on their income  can be imposed upon them. Ignoring these 
constraints by becoming (overly) impudent may also undermine the elite’s agenda-setting 
and framing power: alternative narratives that favour alternative interests will receive 
more attention and followers, perhaps becoming dominant. This may be good news for 
leftist parties but, as recent developments suggest, may equally benefit populist parties, 
bringing  them to greater prominence28. While leftist parties would point to the growing 
demand for social security measures, including re-distributional effects in a quickly 
globalising world (see e.g. Swank/Betz 2003; Houtman/Achterberg/Derks 2008), populist 
parties would – in an attempt to turn back the clock and to fight the alleged causes of the 
incriminated effects – rather than strengthen the national confines by protectionist 
measures (instead of compensating the potential losers of economic globalisation) 
possibly mixed with chauvinistic measures to focus any remaining welfare state 
programmes on national subjects only (see Michel 2014: 171ff.).     
Obviously, both potential reactions are anti-meritocratic in the sense that they reject the 
elite’s pretention merely to pursue the ‘common good’. Therefore, the elite might be 
inclined to instrumentalise the anti-meritocratic mood – rather than to regain dominance 
over the agenda-setting and framing process – by combining populist political 
conceptions of the ‘us and them’ kind with neoliberal economic and social policies. The 
Trump administration, one of the richest and most elitist governments in the history of 
the United States with respect to the socio-economic pedigree of the President and his 
state secretaries, appears to play this game. However, although there might be conceptual 
analogies between right-wing populism and neoliberal market fundamentalism (as the 
basis of meritocratic economic and social policies; see Pühringer/Ötsch 2018), this kind 
of anti-elitism on the part of the elite resembles a ‘riding the tiger’ strategy – a strategy 
that Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation saw as responsible for the rise of fascism 
(Polanyi 1944: 242 ). Let’s hope that history will not repeat itself.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
28  Populism can be defined “as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543).  
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